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Abstract
In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an
existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player
nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals defined with the
help of a doubly controlled backward stochastic differential equation. Our results extend for-
mer ones by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3] and are based on a backward stochastic
differential equation approach.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium; stochastic differential games; backward stochastic differential
equations; stochastic backward semigroups.
1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Isaacs [11], differential games and stochastic differential games have
been investigated by many authors. Fleming and Souganidis [7] were the first to study zero-
sum stochastic differential games and obtained that the lower and the upper value functions of
such games satisfy the dynamic programming principle and coincide under the Isaacs condition.
Recently, basing on the ideas of Fleming and Souganidis [7], Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer
[3] studied Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games,
while Buckdahn and Li [4] generalized at one hand the results of Fleming and Souganidis [7]
for stochastic differential games and simplified the approach considerably by using backward
stochastic differential equations. We refer the reader to Fleming and Souganidis [7] and Friedman
[8] for a description of earlier results. In the present paper we bring ideas of the both papers
[3] and [4] together, in order to study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum
stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals.
As concerns deterministic differential games, since the work of Kononenko [13] in the frame-
work of positional stategies and Tolwinski, Haurie and Leitmann [19] in the framework of Fried-
man strategies, it is well known that deterministic nonzero-sum differential games admit Nash
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equilibrium payoffs. Recently, Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3] generalized the above
result to two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games and obtained an existence and a
characterization for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. On the other hand,
since the works of Case [5] and Friedman [8], Nash equilibrium payoffs should be the solution
of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. Basing on these ideas, Bessoussan and Frehse [1] and Mannucci
[15] generalized the above result to stochastic differential games using the existence of smooth
enough solutions for a system of parabolic partial differential equations, while Hamade`ne, Lep-
eltier and Peng [9], Hamade`ne [10] and Lepeltier, Wu and Yu [14] used a saddle point argument
in the framework of backward stochastic differential equations. But both methods rely heavily
on the assumption of the non degeneracy of diffusion coefficients.
In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games. The generalization of earlier result by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3]
concerns the following aspects: Firstly, our cost functionals are defined by controlled backward
stochastic differential equations, and the admissible control processes depend on events occurring
before the beginning of the stochastic differential game. Thus, our cost functionals are not
necessarily deterministic. Secondly, since our cost functionals are nonlinear, we cannot apply
the methods used in Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3]. We make use of the notion of
stochastic backward semigroups introduced by Peng [17], and the theory of backward stochastic
differential equations. Finally, each player has his own backward stochastic differential equation,
controlled also by the adversary player, which defines his own cost functional.
Beyond the theoretical interest of this paper the result of the paper is also applicable in
finance and economics. For instance, we can consider an application of our theoretical result to
a problem arising in financial markets. Let the financial market consist of a risk-free asset and
risky stocks and consider two investors (players) in this financial market. Both investors try to
maximize their payoff functionals, which are, in general, different. To maximize them, they have
to use investment strategies with delays. Indeed, although both investors react immediately
to the financial market, the financial market is not so quick in reacting to the moves of both
investors. The above described problem leads to a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential
game. We can use our theoretical result to get an existence theorem and a characterization
theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for this game.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notations and preliminar-
ies concerning backward stochastic differential equations, which we will need in what follows. In
Section 3, we give the main results of this paper and their proofs, i.e., an existence theorem and
a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games as well as their proofs.
2 Preliminaries
Let (Ω,F ,P) be the classical Wiener space, i.e., for the given terminal time T > 0, we consider
Ω = C0([0, T ];R
d) as the space of continuous functions h : [0, T ] → Rd such that h(0) = 0,
endowed with the supremum norm, and let P be the Wiener measure on the Borel σ-field B(Ω)
over Ω, with respect to which the coordinate process Bt(ω) = ωt, ω ∈ Ω, t ∈ [0, T ], is a d-
dimensional standard Brownian motion. We denote by NP the collection of all P-null sets in Ω
and define the filtration F = {Ft}t∈[0,T ], which is generated by the coordinate process B and
completed by all P-null sets:
Ft = σ{Bs, s ≤ t} ∨ NP, t ∈ [0, T ],
where NP is the set of all P-null sets.
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Let us introduce the following spaces, which will be needed in what follows.
• L2(Ω,FT ,P;R
n) =
{
ξ | ξ : Ω→ Rn is an FT -measurable random variable such that
E[|ξ|2] < +∞
}
,
• H2(0, T ;Rd) =
{
ϕ | ϕ : Ω× [0, T ]→ Rd is an {Ft}-adapted process such that
E
∫ T
0
|ϕt|
2dt < +∞
}
,
• S2(0, T ;R) =
{
ϕ | ϕ : Ω× [0, T ]→ R is an {Ft}-adapted continuous process such that
E[ sup
0≤t≤T
|ϕt|
2] < +∞
}
.
We consider the BSDE with data (f, ξ) :
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
f(s, Ys, Zs)ds −
∫ T
t
ZsdBs, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.1)
Here f : Ω× [0, T ]×R×Rd → R is such that, for any (y, z) ∈ R×Rd, f(·, y, z) is progressively
measurable. We make the following assumptions:
(H1) (Lipschitz condition): There exists a positive constant L such that for all (t, yi, zi) ∈
[0, T ]× R× Rd, i = 1, 2,
|f(t, y1, z1)− f(t, y2, z2)| ≤ L(|y1 − y2|+ |z1 − z2|).
(H2) f(·, 0, 0) ∈ H2(0, T ;R).
The following existence and uniqueness theorem was established by Pardoux and Peng [16].
Lemma 2.1 Let the assumptions (H1) and (H2) hold. Then, for all ξ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R), BSDE
(2.1) has a unique solution
(Y,Z) ∈ S2(0, T ;R) ×H2(0, T ;Rd).
We recall the well-known comparison theorem for solutions of BSDEs, which has been es-
tablished by El Karoui, Peng and Quenez [6] and Peng [17].
Lemma 2.2 Let ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R), and f
1 and f2 satisfy (H1) and (H2). We denote by
(Y 1, Z1) and (Y 2, Z2) the solutions of BSDEs with data (f1, ξ1) and (f2, ξ2), respectively, and
we suppose that
(i) ξ1 ≤ ξ2, P− a.s.,
(ii) f1(t, Y 2t , Z
2
t ) ≤ f
2(t, Y 2t , Z
2
t ), dtdP − a.e.
Then, we have Y 1t ≤ Y
2
t , a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, if P(ξ
1 < ξ2) > 0, then P(Y 1t <
Y 2t ) > 0, t ∈ [0, T ], and in particular, Y
1
0 < Y
2
0 .
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By virtue of the notations introduced in the above Lemma, for some f : Ω× [0, T ]×R×Rd →
R, we put
f1(s, y, z) = f(s, y, z) + ϕ1(s), f
2(s, y, z) = f(s, y, z) + ϕ2(s).
Then we have the following lemma. For the proof the readers can refer to El Karoui, Peng and
Quenez [6], and Peng [17].
Lemma 2.3 Suppose that ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P), f satisfies (H1) and (H2) and ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈
H2(0, T ;R). We denote by (Y 1, Z1) and (Y 2, Z2) the solution of BSDEs (2.1) with data (f1, ξ1)
and (f2, ξ2), respectively. Then we have the following estimate:
|Y 1t − Y
2
t |
2 +
1
2
E
{∫ T
t
eβ(t−s)[|Y 1s − Y
2
s |
2 + |Z1s − Z
2
s |
2]ds
∣∣∣ Ft}
≤ E
{
eβ(T−t)|ξ1 − ξ2|2
∣∣∣ Ft}+ E{∫ T
t
eβ(t−s)|ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)|
2ds
∣∣∣ Ft} ,
where β = 16(1 + L2) and L is the Lipschitz constant in (H1).
3 Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differen-
tial games
The objective of this section is to investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-
sum stochastic differential games with nonlinear cost functionals. An existence theorem (The-
orem 3.20) and a characterization theorem (Theorem 3.16) of Nash equilibrium payoffs for
two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games are the main results of this section.
Let U and V be two compact metric spaces. Here U is considered as the control state space
of the first player, and V as that of the second one. The associated sets of admissible controls
will be denoted by U and V, respectively. The set U is formed by all U -valued F-progressively
measurable processes, and V is the set of all V -valued F-progressively measurable processes.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we consider the following control system
dX
t,ζ;u,v
s = b(s,X
t,ζ;u,v
s , us, vs)ds+ σ(s,X
t,ζ;u,v
s , us, vs)dBs, s ∈ [t, T ],
X
t,ζ;u,v
t = ζ,
(3.1)
where t ∈ [0, T ] is regarded as the initial time, and ζ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,P;R
n) as the initial state. The
mappings
b : [0, T ]× Rn × U × V → Rn, σ : [0, T ]× Rn × U × V → Rn×d
are supposed to satisfy the following conditions:
(H3.1) For all x ∈ Rn, b(·, x, ·, ·) and σ(·, x, ·, ·) are continuous in (t, u, v);
(H3.2) There exists a positive constant L such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, u ∈ U, v ∈ V ,
|b(t, x, u, v) − b(t, x′, u, v)| + |σ(t, x, u, v) − σ(t, x′, u, v)| ≤ L|x− x′|.
It is obvious that, under the above conditions, for any u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, the control system
(3.1) has a unique strong solution {Xt,ζ;u,vs , 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T}, and we also have the following
estimates.
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Lemma 3.1 For all p ≥ 2, there exists a positive constant Cp such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ζ, ζ ′ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,P;R
n), u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V,
E
{
sup
t≤s≤T
|Xt,ζ;u,vs |
p
∣∣∣Ft
}
≤ Cp(1 + |ζ|
p), P− a.s.,
E
{
sup
t≤s≤T
|Xt,ζ;u,vs −X
t,ζ′;u,v
s |
p
∣∣∣Ft
}
≤ Cp|ζ − ζ
′|p, P− a.s.
Here the constant Cp only depends on p, the Lipschitz constant and the linear growth of b and
σ.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we consider the following BSDE:
Y
t,ζ;u,v
s = Φ(X
t,ζ;u,v
T ) +
∫ T
s
f(r,Xt,ζ;u,vr , Y
t,ζ;u,v
r , Z
t,ζ;u,v
r , ur, vr)dr
−
∫ T
s
Zt,ζ;u,vr dBr, t ≤ s ≤ T,
(3.2)
where Xt,ζ;u,v is introduced in equation (3.1) and
Φ = Φ(x) : Rn → R, f = f(t, x, y, z, u, v) : [0, T ]× Rn × R× Rd × U × V → R
satisfy the following conditions:
(H3.3) For all (x, y, z) ∈ Rn × R× Rd, f(·, x, y, z, ·, ·) is continuous in (t, u, v);
(H3.4) There exists a positive constant L such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ Rn, y, y′ ∈ R,
z, z′ ∈ Rd, u ∈ U and v ∈ V ,
|f(t, x, y, z, u, v) − f(t, x′, y′, z′, u, v)| + |Φ(x)− Φ(x′)|
≤ L(|x− x′|+ |y − y′|+ |z − z′|).
It is by now standard that under the above assumptions equation (3.2) admits a unique solution
(Y t,ζ;u,v, Zt,ζ;u,v) ∈ S2(0, T ;R) ×H2(0, T ;Rd). Moreover, in Buckdahn and Li [4] it was shown
that the following holds:
Proposition 3.2 There exists a positive constant C such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], u(·) ∈ U and
v(·) ∈ V, ζ, ζ ′ ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,P;R
n),
|Y t,ζ;u,vt | ≤ C(1 + |ζ|), P− a.s.,
|Y t,ζ;u,vt − Y
t,ζ′;u,v
t | ≤ C|ζ − ζ
′|, P− a.s.
We now introduce subspaces of admissible controls and give the definition of admissible
strategies.
Definition 3.3 The space Ut,T (resp. Vt,T ) of admissible controls for Player I (resp., II) on
the interval [t, T ] is defined as the space of all processes {ur}r∈[t,T ] (resp., {vr}r∈[t,T ]), which are
F-progressively measurable and take values in U (resp., V ).
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Definition 3.4 A nonanticipating strategy with delay (NAD strategy) for Player I is a measur-
able mapping α : Vt,T → Ut,T , which satisfies the following properties:
1) α is a nonanticipative strategy, i.e., for every F-stopping time τ : Ω → [t, T ], and for
v1, v2 ∈ Vt,T with v1 = v2 on [[t, τ ]], it holds α(v1) = α(v2) on [[t, τ ]]. (Recall that [[t, τ ]] =
{(s, ω) ∈ [t, T ]× Ω, t ≤ s ≤ τ(ω)}).
2) α is a nonanticipative strategy with delay, i.e., for all v ∈ Vt,T , there exists an increasing
sequence of stopping times {Sn(v)}n≥1 with
i) t = S0(v) ≤ S1(v) ≤ · · · ≤ Sn(v) ≤ · · · ≤ T ,
ii) Sn(v) < Sn+1(v) on {Sn(v) < T}, n ≥ 0,
iii) P(
⋃
n≥1{Sn(v) = T}) = 1,
such that, for all n ≥ 1, Λ ∈ Ft and v, v
′ ∈ Vt,T , we have: if v = v
′ on [[t, Sn−1(v)]]
⋂
(Λ× [t, T ]),
then
iv) Sl(v) = Sl(v
′), on Λ, P-a.s., 1 ≤ l ≤ n,
v) α(v) = α(v′), on [[t, Sn(v)]]
⋂
(Λ× [t, T ]).
The set of all NAD strategies for Player I for games over the time interval [t, T ] is denoted
by At,T . The set of all NAD strategies β : Ut,T → Vt,T for Player II for games over the time
interval [t, T ] is defined symmetrically and denoted by Bt,T .
We have the following lemma, which is useful in what follows.
Lemma 3.5 Let α ∈ At,T and β ∈ Bt,T . Then there exists a unique couple of admissible control
processes (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that
α(v) = u, β(u) = v.
Such a result can be found already in [3]. However, since our definition of NAD strategies differs,
we shall provide its proof.
For given control processes u(·) ∈ Ut,T and v(·) ∈ Vt,T , we introduce now the associated cost
functional
J(t, x;u, v) := Y t,x;u,vs
∣∣
s=t
, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn.
(Recall that Y t,x;u,v is defined by BSDE (3.2) with ζ = x ∈ Rn). We define the lower and the
upper value functions W and U , resp., of the game: For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, we put
W (t, x) := esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J(t, x;α, β),
and
U(t, x) := essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
J(t, x;α, β).
Here we use Lemma 3.5 to identify (Xt,x;α,β, Y t,x;α,β, Zt,x;α,β) = (Xt,x;u,v, Y t,x;u,v, Zt,x;u,v), and,
in particular, J(t, x;α, β) = J(t, x;u, v), where (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T is the couple of controls
associated with (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T by the relation (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v).
Remark 3.6 For the convenience of the reader we recall the notion of the essential infimum
and the essential supremum of families of random variables (see, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve [12]
for more details). Given a family of F-measurable real valued random variables ξα (α ∈ I), an
F-measurable random variable ξ is said to be essinfα∈I ξα, if
(i) ξ ≤ ξα,P− a.s., for all α ∈ I;
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(ii) if for any random variable η such that η ≤ ξα, P-a.s., for all α ∈ I, it holds that η ≤ ξ,
P-a.s.
We introduce notion of esssupα∈I ξα by the following relation:
esssup
α∈I
ξα = − essinf
α∈I
(−ξα).
Remark 3.7 Lemma 3.5 guarantees that for NAD strategies α ∈ At,T and β ∈ Bt,T there exists
a unique associate couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T of admissible controls such that α(v) = u, β(u) = v.
For general nonanticipative strategies we can, in general, not get such a couple of controls. Let
us give an example: We suppose that U = V and ϕ,ψ : U → U are measurable functions such
that ψ ◦ ϕ doesn’t have a fixed point. We define
α(v)s = ϕ(vs), s ∈ [t, T ], v ∈ Vt,T ,
β(u)s = ψ(us), s ∈ [t, T ], u ∈ Ut,T .
Then α and β are nonanticipative strategies for Player I and II, respectively. But there is no
couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that α(v) = u, β(u) = v. Indeed, if there existed such couple of
controls (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , we would have, for s ∈ [t, T ],
us = α(v)s = ϕ(vs),
vs = β(u)s = ψ(us) = ψ ◦ ϕ(vs).
But this means that vs is a fixed point of ψ◦ϕ, which contradicts the assumptions of the absence
of fixed points.
Let us now give the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Proof: We give the proof in two steps.
Step 1: For (u, v) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T we denote by {Sn(v)}n≥1 (resp. {Tn(u)}n≥1) the sequence of
stopping times associated with α ∈ At,T (resp. β ∈ Bt,T ) by Definition 3.4. Then, for arbitrarily
given (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T we define the optional set
Γ :=
⋃
n≥1
(
[Sn(v)] ∪ [Tn(u)]
)
,
where [Sn(v)] (resp. [Tn(u)]) denotes the graph of Sn(v) (resp. Tn(u)). Then, for ω ∈ Ω, we
have
Γ(ω) =
{
Sn(v)(ω), Tl(u)(ω), n, l ≥ 1, s.t. Sn(v)(ω) < T, Tl(u)(ω) < T
}⋃{
T
}
,
and we observe that Γ(ω) is a finite set.
We denote by DΓ the first hitting time of Γ, and we define a sequence of {Fr}-stopping times
as follows:
τ0 = t,
τ1(u, v) = DΓ(= S1(v) ∧ T1(u)),
τ2(u, v) = DΓ\[τ1(u,v)] ∧ T,
...
τn(u, v) = DΓ\∪n−1i=1 [τi(u,v)]
∧ T, n ≥ 1.
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Recall that a ∧ b = min{a, b}, a, b ∈ R.
We notice that τ1(u, v) is independent of (u, v), and for n ≥ 2, τn(u, v) depends only on
(u, v)|[[t,τn−1(u,v)]]. Indeed, this is a direct consequence of point 2) in Definition 3.4 and the
definition of {τn(u, v)}n≥1.
From the definition of {τn}n≥1 it follows that, for all (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
i) t = τ0 ≤ τ1(u, v) ≤ · · · ≤ τn(u, v) ≤ · · · ≤ T ,
ii) τn(u, v) < τn+1(u, v), on {τn(u, v) < T}, n ≥ 0. Moreover, since Γ(ω) is a finite set,
P(dω)− a.s., P(
⋃
n≥1{τn(u, v) = T}) = 1.
iii) For n ≥ 1 and all (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ Ut,T×Vt,T , it holds: if (u, v) = (u
′, v′) on [[t, τn−1(u, v)]],
then τl(u, v) = τl(u
′, v′), 1 ≤ l ≤ n, and α(v) = α(v′) and β(u) = β(u′), on [[t, τn(u, v)]].
Step 2: For α ∈ At,T and β ∈ Bt,T , we let {τn}n≥1 be constructed as above. Since neither
τ1 depends on the controls nor (α, β) restricted to [[t, τ1]] does, the process
(u0, v0) := (α(v0), β(u0)), for arbitrary (u0, v0) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
is such that α(v0) = u0 and β(u0) = v0, on [[t, τ1]].
Taking into account that τ2 only depends on the controls restricted to [[t, τ1]], and (α(v
0), β(u0))
|[[t,τ2(u0,v0)]] only depends on the controls (u
0, v0) restricted to [[t, τ1]], we can define
(u1, v1) := (α(v0), β(u0)),
and since we have (u1, v1) = (u0, v0) on on [[t, τ1]], it follows that (u
1, v1) = (α(v1), β(u1)), on
[[t, τ2(u
1, v1)]]. Repeating the above argument we put
(un, vn) := (α(vn−1), β(un−1)) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T .
Then, since due to (n−1)th iteration step (α(vn−1), β(un−1)) = (un−1, vn−1), on [[t, τn(u
n−1, vn−1)]],
we also have (un−1, vn−1) = (un, vn), on [[t, τn(u
n−1, vn−1)]], and, thus, also τl(u
n, vn) =
τl(u
n−1, vn−1), 0 ≤ l ≤ n+ 1. Hence,
τn(u
n−1, vn−1) = τn(u
n, vn) ≤ τn+1(u
n, vn) = τn+1(u
n+1, vn+1), n ≥ 1,
from which we deduce the existence of the limit of stopping times
τ := lim
n→∞
τn(u
n, vn) ≤ T.
For arbitrarily given (u0, v0) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T we define
(u, v) :=
∑
n≥0
(un, vn)1[[τn−1(un−1,vn−1),τn(un,vn)[[ + (u0, v0)1[[τ,T ]].
Obviously, (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , and since (u, v) = (u
n, vn) on [[t, τn(u
n, vn)]], we have τl(u, v) =
τl(u
n, vn), 0 ≤ l ≤ n + 1, n ≥ 0 (see the above property iii)). But this allows to conclude from
ii) that
P
( ⋃
n≥1
{τn(u
n, vn) = T}
)
= P
( ⋃
n≥1
{τn(u, v) = T}
)
= 1.
Consequently, since the above defined process (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T has the property that
(α(v), β(u)) = (α(vn), β(un)) on [[t, τn(u, v)]] (nonanticipativity of (α, β))
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= (un, vn) = (u, v) on [[t, τn(u, v)]],
we have (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v) on [t, T ]× Ω, dsdP− a.e. The proof is complete. 
The following lemmas were established in [2] under a slightly different definition of NAD
strategies. However, their validity in our new framework can be checked easily.
Lemma 3.8 Under assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.4), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, the value functions
W (t, x) and U(t, x) are deterministic functions.
Lemma 3.9 There exists a positive constant C such that, for all t, t′ ∈ [0, T ] and x, x′ ∈ Rn,
we have
(i) W (t, x) is 12-Ho¨lder continuous in t:
|W (t, x)−W (t′, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|)|t− t′|
1
2 ;
(ii) |W (t, x)−W (t, x′)| ≤ C|x− x′|.
The same properties hold true for the function U .
Remark 3.10 From the above Lemma it follows, in particular, that the functions W and U are
of at most linear growth, i.e., there exists a positive constant C such that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and
x ∈ Rn, |W (t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|).
We now recall the notion of stochastic backward semigroups, which was introduced by Peng
[17] and translated by Buckdahn and Li [4] into the framework of stochastic differential games.
For a given initial condition (t, x), a positive number δ ≤ T − t, for admissible control processes
u(·) ∈ Ut,t+δ and v(·) ∈ Vt,t+δ, and a real-valued random variable η ∈ L
2(Ω,Ft+δ ,P;R), we
define
G
t,x;u,v
t,t+δ [η] := Y
t,x;u,v
t ,
where (Y
t,x;u,v
s , Z
t,x;u,v
s )t≤s≤t+δ is the unique solution of the following BSDE with time horizon
t+ δ:
Y
t,x;u,v
s = η +
∫ t+δ
s
f(r,Xt,x;u,vr , Y
t,x;u,v
r , Z
t,x;u,v
r , ur, vr)dr
−
∫ t+δ
s
Z
t,x;u,v
r dBr, t ≤ s ≤ t+ δ,
and Xt,x;u,v is the unique solution of equation (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ Rn.
We observe that for the solution Y t,x;u,v of BSDE (3.2) with ζ = x ∈ Rn we have
J(t, x;u, v) = Y t,x;u,vt = G
t,x;u,v
t,T [Φ(X
t,x;u,v
T )] = G
t,x;u,v
t,t+δ [Y
t,x;u,v
t+δ ]
= Gt,x;u,vt,t+δ [J(t+ δ,X
t,x;u,v
t+δ ;u, v)].
Remark 3.11 For the special case that f is independent of (y, z) we have
G
t,x;u,v
s,T [Φ(X
t,x;u,v
T )] = G
t,x;u,v
s,t+δ [Y
t,x;u,v
t+δ ]
= E[Y t,x;u,vt+δ +
∫ t+δ
s
f(r,Xt,x;u,vr , ur, vr)dr
∣∣∣ Fs], s ∈ [t, t+ δ].
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In particular,
G
t,x;u,v
t,T [Φ(X
t,x;u,v
T )] = E[Φ(X
t,x;u,v
T ) +
∫ T
t
f(r,Xt,x;u,vr , ur, vr)dr
∣∣∣ Ft].
For more details on stochastic backward semigroups the reader is referred to Peng [17] and
Buckdahn and Li [4]. Let us also recall the following dynamic programming principle for the
value functions of stochastic differential games. Its proof can be found in [2].
Proposition 3.12 Under the assumptions (H3.1)–(H3.4) the following dynamic programming
principle holds: for all 0 < δ ≤ T − t, x ∈ Rn,
W (t, x) = esssup
α∈At,t+δ
essinf
β∈Bt,t+δ
G
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [W (t+ δ,X
t,x;α,β
t+δ )],
and
U(t, x) = essinf
β∈Bt,t+δ
esssup
α∈At,t+δ
G
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [U(t+ δ,X
t,x;α,β
t+δ )].
After having recalled some basics on two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games, let us
introduce the framework of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games where each of
the both players has his own terminal as well as running cost functionals Φj and fj, respectively,
j = 1, 2. More precisely, for arbitrarily given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we
consider the following BSDEs, j = 1, 2,
jY
t,ζ;u,v
s = Φj(X
t,ζ;u,v
T ) +
∫ T
s
fj(r,X
t,ζ;u,v
r ,
jY t,ζ;u,vr ,
jZt,ζ;u,vr , ur, vr)dr
−
∫ T
s
jZt,ζ;u,vr dBr, t ≤ s ≤ T,
where Xt,ζ;u,v is introduced by equation (3.1) and
Φj = Φj(x) : R
n → R,
fj = fj(t, x, y, z, u, v) : [0, T ] × R
n × R× Rd × U × V → R,
are assumed to satisfy the conditions (H3.3) and (H3.4). In addition, in order to simplify the
arguments, we also suppose that
(H3.5) Φj and fj, j = 1, 2, are bounded.
The associated stochastic backward semigroups are denoted by jGt,x;u,vt,s , t ≤ s ≤ T, j = 1, 2,
and for the associated cost functionals Jj(t, x;u, v) =
jY
t,x;u,v
t , we have
Jj(t, x;u, v) =
jG
t,x;u,v
t,T [Φj(X
t,x;u,v
T )] =
jG
t,x;u,v
t,t+δ [
jY
t,x;u,v
t+δ ]
= jGt,x;u,vt,t+δ [Jj(t+ δ,X
t,x;u,v
t+δ , u, v)],
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T , 0 ≤ δ ≤ T − t, j = 1, 2.
For what follows we assume that the Isaacs condition holds in the following sense: For all
(t, x, y, p) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn×R×Rn and A ∈ Sn (Recall that Sn denotes the set of n×n symmetric
matrices) and for j = 1, 2, we have
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + 〈p, b(t, x, u, v)〉 + fj(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
= inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (t, x, u, v)A) + 〈p, b(t, x, u, v)〉 + fj(t, x, y, p
Tσ(t, x, u, v), u, v)
}
.
(3.3)
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Under the Isaacs condition (3.3) we have, similar to [2],
W1(t, x) = esssup
α∈At,T
essinf
β∈Bt,T
J1(t, x;α, β) = essinf
β∈Bt,T
esssup
α∈At,T
J1(t, x;α, β),
and
W2(t, x) = essinf
α∈At,T
esssup
β∈Bt,T
J2(t, x;α, β) = esssup
β∈Bt,T
essinf
α∈At,T
J2(t, x;α, β), (3.4)
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
Finally, we complete the preparation with the definition of the Nash equilibrium payoff
of stochastic differential games, which is similar to the definition introduced by Buckdahn,
Cardaliaguet and Rainer [3].
Definition 3.13 A couple (e1, e2) ∈ R
2 is called a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x) if
for any ε > 0, there exists (αε, βε) ∈ At,T ×Bt,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;α, βε)− ε, J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε, β) − ε, P− a.s., (3.5)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;αε, βε)]− ej | ≤ ε, j = 1, 2.
Remark 3.14 We attract the reader’s attention to the fact that Jj(t, x;α, β), j = 1, 2, are
random variables. In our existence result (Theorem 3.20) we will construct cost functionals
Jj(t, x;αε, βε), ε > 0, j = 1, 2, which are deterministic.
By virtue of Lemma 3.5 we can easily get the following lemma.
Lemma 3.15 For any ε > 0 and (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T , (3.5) holds if and only if, for all
(u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;u, βε(u))− ε, J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε(v), v) − ε, P− a.s. (3.6)
We now give the characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum
stochastic differential games.
Theorem 3.16 Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn. Under Isaacs condition (3.3), (e1, e2) ∈ R
2 is a Nash
equilibrium payoff at point (t, x) if and only if for all ε > 0, there exist (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T
such that for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
P
(
jY t,x;u
ε,vε
s ≥Wj(s,X
t,x;uε,vε
s )− ε | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε, P− a.s., (3.7)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;u
ε, vε)]− ej | ≤ ε. (3.8)
Remark 3.17 The above Theorem generalizes the results of [3] and [18] from the case of clas-
sical cost functionals without running costs to nonlinear cost functionals which running cost
fj, j = 1, 2, depend on (y, z). Moreover, in our framework the controls can depend on events
occurring before time t.
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We prepare the proof of this Theorem by the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.18 Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn and u ∈ Ut,T be arbitrarily fixed. Then,
(i) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T such that, for all
v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v) = u, on [t, t+ δ],
2Y
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ≤ W2(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ) + ε, P− a.s.
(ii) for all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ At,T such that, for all
v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v) = u, on [t, t+ δ],
1Y
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ≥ W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ )− ε, P− a.s.
Proof: We only give the proof of (i). Indeed, (ii) can be proved by a symmetric argument.
We begin with observing that putting βv
′
(u′) = v′, for all u′ ∈ Ut+δ,T , defines for every v
′ ∈ Vt+δ,T
an element βv
′
∈ Bt+δ,T and allows to regard Vt+δ,T as a subset of Bt+δ,T . Consequently, from
(3.4), for any y ∈ Rn, we have
W2(t+ δ, y) = essinf
α∈At+δ,T
esssup
β∈Bt+δ,T
J2(t+ δ, y;α, β)
≥ essinf
α∈At+δ,T
esssup
v∈Vt+δ,T
J2(t+ δ, y;α(v), v), P− a.s.
Therefore, for ε0 > 0, there exists αy ∈ At+δ,T such that
W2(t+ δ, y) ≥ esssup
v∈Vt+δ,T
J2(t+ δ, y;αy(v), v) − ε0, P− a.s. (3.9)
(The existence of αy ∈ At+δ,T can be shown with the techniques used in the proof of Lemma
3.8 in Buckdahn and Li [4]).
Let {Oi}i≥1 ⊂ B(R
n) be a partition of Rn such that
∑
i≥1
Oi = R
n, Oi 6= ∅, and diam(Oi) ≤
ε0, i ≥ 1. Let yi ∈ Oi, i ≥ 1. We put, for v ∈ Vt,T ,
α(v)s =

us, s ∈ [t, t+ δ],∑
i≥1
1{Xt,x;u,v
t+δ ∈Oi}
αyi(v|[t+δ,T ])s, s ∈ (t+ δ, T ].
(3.10)
The such introduced mapping α : Vt,T → Ut,T is an NAD strategy. Indeed,
(i) The mapping α is nonanticipative. Proof: For every (Fr)-stopping time τ : Ω → [t, T ],
and for v1, v2 ∈ Vt,T with v1 = v2 on [[t, τ ]], we decompose v1, v2 into v
1
1, v
1
2 ∈ Vt,t+δ and
v21 , v
2
2 ∈ Vt+δ,T such that v
1
i = vi on [t, t + δ], and v
2
i = vi on [t + δ, T ], i = 1, 2. In order to
abbreviate, we will write for this: v1 = v
1
1 ⊕ v
2
1 and v2 = v
1
2 ⊕ v
2
2. Then we have v
1
1 = v
1
2 on
[[t, τ∧(t+δ)]] and v21 = v
2
2 on [[τ∧(t+δ), τ ]]. It is obvious that α(v1) = u = α(v2) on [t, t+δ] and,
hence, also on [[t, τ ∧(t+δ)]]. Since v11 = v
1
2 on [[t, τ ∧(t+δ)]], we have X
t,x;α(v11),v
1
1
t+δ = X
t,x;α(v12),v
1
2
t+δ
on {τ > t+ δ},P − a.s. Therefore, because of the nonanticipativity of αyi , i ≥ 1,
α(v1) =
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v11),v
1
1
t+δ ∈Oi}
αyi(v
2
1) =
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v12),v
1
2
t+δ ∈Oi}
αyi(v
2
2) = α(v2)
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on [[τ ∧ (t+ δ), τ ]].
(ii) The mapping α is a nonanticipative strategy with delay. Proof: For v = v1 ⊕ v2 ∈
Vt,t+δ × Vt+δ,T , we have
α(v) = u⊕
∑
i≥1
1
{Xt,x;u,v
1
t+δ ∈Oi}
αyi(v
2).
Let {Sin(v
2)}n≥1 be the sequence of the stopping times associated with αyi ∈ At+δ,T in the sense
of the Definition 3.4. Then, putting S0 = t, S1 = t+ δ,
Sn+1(v) =
∑
i≥1
1
{Xt,x;u,v
1
t+δ ∈Oi}
Sin(v
2), n ≥ 1.
We have that {Sn(v)}n≥1 satisfies the condition 2) in Definition 3.4. Thus, α is a nonanticipative
strategy with delay.
From Lemma 3.9, (3.9) and (3.10) it follows that, for v ∈ Vt,T ,
W2(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ )
≥
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ∈Oi}
W2(t+ δ, yi)− Cε0
≥
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ∈Oi}
J2(t+ δ, yi;αyi(v|[t+δ,T ]), v)− Cε0
=
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ∈Oi}
J2(t+ δ, yi;α(v), v) − Cε0.
Thus, from Proposition 3.2,
W2(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ) ≥
∑
i≥1
1
{X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ∈Oi}
J2(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ;α(v), v) −Cε0
= J2(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ;α(v), v) − Cε0.
Here C is a constant which can vary from line to line, but which is independent of v ∈ Vt,T .
Putting ε0 = εC
−1 in the latter estimate, we obtain
W2(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ) ≥ J2(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ ;α(v), v) − ε, v ∈ Vt,T .
The proof is complete. 
The proof of Theorem 3.16 necessitates the following lemma.
Lemma 3.19 There exists a positive constant C such that, for all (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
and for all Fr-stopping times S : Ω → [t, T ] with X
t,x;u,v
S = X
t,x;u′,v′
S , P − a.s., it holds, for all
real τ ∈ [t, T ],
E[ sup
0≤s≤τ
|Xt,x;u,v(S+s)∧T −X
t,x;u′,v′
(S+s)∧T |
2
∣∣∣Ft] ≤ Cτ, P− a.s.
This lemma is the result of a straight forward estimate using the fact that b and σ are bounded.
Let us give now the proof of Theorem 3.16.
Proof of Theorem 3.16: Sufficiency of (3.7) and (3.8).
Proof: Let ε > 0 be arbitrarily fixed. For ε0 > 0 being specified later we suppose that
(uε0 , vε0) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T satisfies (3.7) and (3.8), i.e., for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
P
(
jY t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s ≥Wj(s,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
s )− ε0 | Ft
)
≥ 1− ε0, P− a.s., (3.11)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0)]− ej | ≤ ε0. (3.12)
Let us fix some partition: t = t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tm = T of [t, T ] and τ = sup
i
|ti − ti+1|. We apply
Lemma 3.18 to uε0 and t+ δ = t1, · · · , tm, successively. Then, for ε1 > 0 (ε1 depends on ε and
is specified later) there exist NAD strategies αi ∈ At,T , i = 1, · · · ,m, such that, for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
αi(v) = u
ε0 , on [t, ti],
2Y
t,x;αi(v),v
ti
≤ W2(ti,X
t,x;αi(v),v
ti
) + ε1,P− a.s. (3.13)
For all v ∈ Vt,T , we define
Sv = inf
{
s ≥ t | λ({r ∈ [t, s] : vr 6= v
ε0
r }) > 0
}
,
tv = inf
{
ti ≥ S
v | i = 1, · · · ,m
}
∧ T,
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on the real line R. Obviously, Sv and tv are stopping
times, and we have Sv ≤ tv ≤ Sv + τ .
Let
αε(v) =

uε0 , on [[t, tv]],
αi(v), on (ti, T ]× {t
v = ti}, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
It is easy to check that αε is an NAD strategy. From (3.13) it follows that
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
tv =
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
ti
1{tv=ti}
≤
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;αε(v),v
ti
)1{tv=ti} + ε1
= W2(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv ) + ε1, P− a.s. (3.14)
In what follows we will show that, for all ε > 0 and v ∈ Vt,T ,
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + ε, αε(v
ε0) = uε0 . (3.15)
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This relation as well as the symmetric one for J1 will lead to the sufficiency of (3.7) and (3.8).
For the proof of (3.15), we note that by (3.14), Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.3 there exists a positive
constant C such that
J2(t, x, αε(v), v) =
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x,αε(v),v
tv ]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv ) + ε1]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )] + Cε1. (3.16)
Thanks to the Lemmas 3.9 and 3.19 as well as the definitions of tv and αε we have
E[|W2(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )−W2(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )|
2
∣∣∣Ft]
≤ CE[|Xt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
tv −X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv |
2
∣∣∣Ft]
≤ Cτ, P− a.s.
Thus, from Lemma 2.3 it follows that
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )]−
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )]|
≤ CE[|W2(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )−W2(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )|
2
∣∣∣Ft] 12
≤ Cτ
1
2 ,
and the above inequality and (3.16) yield
J2(t, x, αε(v), v)
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )]−
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;αε(v),v
tv )]|
+| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )] +Cε1
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2 .
For s ∈ [t, T ], we put
Ωs =
{
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
s ≥W2(s,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
s )− ε0
}
.
By the inequality a ≤ b+ |a− b|, a, b ∈ R, we have
J2(t, x;αε(v), v)
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [W2(t
v,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv )] + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2
= 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}] +Cε1 + Cτ
1
2
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ] + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2
+| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}]
− 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]|. (3.17)
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Using Lemma 2.3 again as well as the boundedness of W2, we see that
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}]
− 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]|
≤ CE[
m∑
i=1
|W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)|21{tv=ti}1Ωcti
∣∣∣Ft] 12
≤ C
m∑
i=1
P(Ωcti |Ft)
1
2 ≤ Cmε
1
2
0 , (3.18)
where we have used (3.11) for the latter estimate. Observing that
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
≥W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)− ε0, on Ωti ,
we deduce from the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 that
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
(2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
ti
+ ε0)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
1{tv=ti}1Ωti + ε0]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
1{tv=ti}1Ωti ] + Cε0.
Hence, taking into account 2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
tv =
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
ti
1{tv=ti} and that, in analogy to (3.18)
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]−
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
2Y
t,x;αε(v),v
ti
1{tv=ti}]|
≤ Cmε
1
2
0 ,
we see that
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ] + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
≤ | 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]−
2G
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
+ 2Gt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ] + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0
= | 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]−
2G
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
+J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 .
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In the frame of the proof of (3.15) we also need the following estimate
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]−
2G
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]| ≤ Cτ
1
2 .
In order to verify this relation we let, for all s ∈ [t, tv],
ys =
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
s,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ],
and we consider the BSDE solved by y = (ys)
ys =
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv +
∫ tv
s
f2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r , yr, zr, αε(vr), vr)dr −
∫ tv
s
zrdBr,
as well as
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
s = 2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv +
∫ tv
s
f2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r ,
2Y t,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r ,
2Zt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r , u
ε0
r , v
ε0
r )dr
−
∫ tv
s
2Zt,x;u
ε0 ,vε0
r dBr, s ∈ [t, t
v].
We notice that αε(v) = u
ε0 , on [[t, tv ]], v = vε0 , on [[t, Sv]]. (Of course, these equalities, in
particular, the latter one, are understood as dsdP− a.e.) Thanks to Lemma 2.3 we have
| 2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]−
2G
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
t,tv [
2Y
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
tv ]|
2
≤ CE[
∫ Sv
t
|f2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r , yr, zr, αε(v)r, vr)− f2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r , yr, zr, u
ε0
r , v
ε0
r )|
2dr|Ft]
+CE[
∫ tv
Sv
|f2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r , yr, zr, αε(v)r, vr)− f2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r , yr, zr, u
ε0
r , v
ε0
r )|
2dr|Ft]
= CE[
∫ tv
Sv
|f2(r,X
t,x;αε(v),v
r , yr, zr, αε(v)r, vr)− f2(r,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
r , yr, zr, u
ε0
r , v
ε0
r )|
2dr|Ft]
≤ CE[
∫ tv
Sv
1{vr 6=v
ε0
r }
dr|Ft] ≤ CE[t
v − Sv|Ft] ≤ Cτ.
Therefore, we have
2G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,tv [
m∑
i=1
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε0 ,vε0
ti
)1{tv=ti}1Ωti ]
≤ Cτ
1
2 + J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) +Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 ,
and (3.17), (3.18) as well as the above inequality yield
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2 .
We can choose τ > 0, ε0 > 0, and ε1 > 0 such that Cε0 + Cmε
1
2
0 + Cε1 + Cτ
1
2 ≤ ε and ε0 < ε.
Thus,
J2(t, x;αε(v), v) ≤ J2(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + ε, v ∈ Vt,T .
By a symmetric argument we can construct βε ∈ Bt,T such that, for all u ∈ Ut,T ,
J1(t, x;u, βε(u)) ≤ J1(t, x;u
ε0 , vε0) + ε, βε(u
ε0) = vε0 . (3.19)
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Finally, by virtue of (3.15), (3.19), (3.12) and Lemma 3.15 we can see that (αε, βε) satisfies
Definition 3.13. Therefore, (e1, e2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff. 
Proof of Theorem 3.16: Necessity of (3.7) and (3.8).
Proof: We assume that (e1, e2) ∈ R
2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x).
Then, for all sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists (αε, βε) ∈ At,T × Bt,T such that, for all
(α, β) ∈ At,T × Bt,T
J1(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J1(t, x;α, βε)− ε
4, J2(t, x;αε, βε) ≥ J2(t, x;αε, β)− ε
4,P− a.s., (3.20)
and
|E[Jj(t, x;αε, βε)]− ej | ≤ ε
4, j = 1, 2. (3.21)
Moreover, from Lemma 3.5 we know that there exists a unique couple (uε, vε) such that
αε(v
ε) = uε, βε(u
ε) = vε.
Let us argue by contradiction. For this we observe that (3.21) means that (3.8) holds. Assuming
that (3.7) doesn’t hold true, we have, for all ε′ > 0, the existence of some ε ∈ (0, ε′) (for which
we use the notations introduced above) and δ ∈ [0, T − t] such that, for some j ∈ {1, 2}, say for
j = 1,
P
(
P( 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ < W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )− ε | Ft) > ε
)
> 0. (3.22)
Put
A =
{
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ < W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )− ε
}
∈ Ft+δ . (3.23)
By applying Lemma 3.18 to uε and t + δ we see that, there exists an NAD strategy α˜ ∈ At,T ,
such that, for all v ∈ Vt,T ,
α˜(v) = uε, on [t, t+ δ],
1Y
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ ≥ W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ )−
ε
2
, P− a.s. (3.24)
By virtue of Lemma 3.5 there exists a unique couple (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T such that
α˜(v) = u, βε(u) = v.
We observe that this, in particular, means that u = uε on [t, t+ δ]. Let us define now a control
u˜ ∈ Ut,T as follows:
u˜ =

uε, on ([t, t+ δ)× Ω) ∪ ([t+ δ, T ]×Ac),
u, on [t+ δ, T ] ×A.
Since βε ∈ Bt,T is nonanticipative it follows that βε(u˜) = βε(u
ε) = vε on [t, t + δ], and for all
s ∈ [t+ δ, T ],
βε(u˜)s =

βε(u)s = vs, on A,
βε(u
ε)s = v
ε
s, on A
c.
18
Then we have
Xt,x;u˜,βε(u˜) = Xt,x;u
ε,vε , on [t, t+ δ],
Xt,x;u˜,βε(u˜) =

Xt,x;α˜(v),v , on [t+ δ, T ] ×A,
Xt,x;u
ε,vε , on [t+ δ, T ] ×Ac,
and standard arguments show that also
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t+δ =

1Y
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ , on A,
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ , on A
c.
Therefore,
J1(t, x; u˜, βε(u˜)) =
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t =
1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t+δ ]
= 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t+δ 1A +
1Y
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t+δ 1Ac ]
= 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ 1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac ].
Thanks to Lemma 2.2 and (3.24) we have
J1(t, x; u˜, βε(u˜)) =
1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ 1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac ]
≥ 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [(W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;α˜(v),v
t+δ )−
ε
2
)1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac ]
= 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac −
ε
2
1A].
Hence, from (3.23) it follows that
J1(t, x; u˜, βε(u˜)) ≥
1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac −
ε
2
1A]
≥ 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [(
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ + ε)1A +
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ 1Ac −
ε
2
1A]
= 1G
t,x;u˜,βε(u˜)
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A]
= 1Gt,x;u
ε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A]. (3.25)
Let
ys =
1G
t,x;uε,vε
s,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A], s ∈ [t, t+ δ].
This process is the solution of the following BSDE:
ys =
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A +
∫ t+δ
s
f1(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
−
∫ t+δ
s
zrdBr, s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
which we compare with
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
s = 1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
∫ t+δ
s
f1(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
−
∫ t+δ
s
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
r dBr, s ∈ [t, t+ δ].
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Putting
ys = ys −
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
s , zs = zs −
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
s , s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
we have
ys =
∫ t+δ
s
[f1(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)− f1(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)]dr
+
ε
2
1A −
∫ t+δ
s
zrdBr, s ∈ [t, t+ δ]. (3.26)
For notational simplification let us assume that the Brownian motion B is one dimensional, and
we introduce, for r ∈ [t, t+ δ],
ar = 1{yr 6=0}(yr)
−1
(
f1(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)− f1(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r , zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
)
,
br = 1{zr 6=0}(zr)
−1
(
f1(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r , zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
−f1(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r ,
1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
r ,
1Zt,x;u
ε,vε
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)
)
.
Then, from the Lipschitz property of f1 we see that |ar| ≤ L, |br| ≤ L, r ∈ [t, t+ δ], and BSDE
(3.26) takes the following form:
ys =
ε
2
1A +
∫ t+δ
s
[aryr + brzr]dr −
∫ t+δ
s
zrdBr, s ∈ [t, t+ δ].
By putting
Qs = exp
(∫ s
t
ardr +
∫ s
t
brdBr −
1
2
∫ s
t
|br|
2dr
)
, s ∈ [t, t+ δ],
applying Itoˆ’s formula to ysQs, and then taking the conditional expectation, we deduce that
yt =
ε
2
E[1AQt+δ |Ft].
By the Schwarz inequality we have
P(A|Ft)
2 = (E[1A|Ft])
2 ≤ E[1AQt+δ |Ft]E[Q
−1
t+δ |Ft].
We observe that
E[Q−1t+δ |Ft] = E[exp
(
−
∫ t+δ
t
ardr −
∫ t+δ
t
brdBr +
1
2
∫ t+δ
t
|br|
2dr
)
| Ft]
≤ exp(Lδ + L2δ)E[exp
(
−
∫ t+δ
t
brdBr −
1
2
∫ t+δ
t
|br|
2dr
)
| Ft]
= exp(Lδ + L2δ).
Let
∆ =
{
P( 1Y t,x;u
ε,vε
t+δ < W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )− ε | Ft) > ε
}(
= {P(A|Ft) > ε}
)
.
Then,
yt =
ε
2
E[1AQt+δ |Ft]
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≥
exp(−Lδ − L2δ)ε
2
(E[1A|Ft])
2 =
exp(−Lδ − L2δ)ε
2
(P(A|Ft))
2
>
ε3
2
C01∆, (3.27)
for C0 = exp(−Lδ − L
2δ), where we use (3.22) in the last inequality. Combining (3.27) with
yt = yt −
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t =
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A]−
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ ],
we have
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ +
ε
2
1A] >
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [
1Y
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ ] +
ε3
2
C01∆,
and (3.25) then yields
J1(t, x; u˜, βε(u˜)) > J1(t, x;αε, βε) +
ε3
2
C01∆.
We can choose ε′ ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small such that
ε′3
2
C0 > ε
′4 (Recall that ε′ > 0 has been
introduced at the beginning of the proof, assuming that (3.7) doesn’t hold true). Then this rela-
tion is also satisfied by ε ∈ (0, ε′) :
ε3
2
C0 > ε
4. Since P(∆) > 0, the above inequality contradicts
with (3.20) for α(·) = u˜. The proof is complete. 
We now give the existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Theorem 3.20 Let the Isaacs condition (3.3) hold. Then for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, there exists
a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x).
Let us admit the following Proposition for the moment. We shall give its proof after.
Proposition 3.21 Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.16, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T independent of Ft such that, for all t ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ T , j = 1, 2,
P
(
Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
)− ε ≤ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2
[Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2
)]
)
> 1− ε.
Let us begin with the proof of Theorem 3.20.
Proof: By Theorem 3.16 we only have to prove that, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈
Ut,T × Vt,T which satisfies (3.7) and (3.8) for s ∈ [t, T ], j = 1, 2.
For ε > 0, we consider (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T given by Proposition 3.21, i.e., in particular,
(uε, vε) is independent of Ft, and we put s1 = s, s2 = T in Proposition 3.21. This yields (3.7). We
also observe that the fact that (uε, vε) is independent of Ft implies that Jj(t, x;u
ε, vε), j = 1, 2,
are deterministic and
{
(J1(t, x;u
ε, vε), J2(t, x;u
ε, vε)), ε > 0
}
is a bounded sequence. Conse-
quently, we can choose an accumulation point of this sequence, as ε → 0. Let us denote this
point by (e1, e2). Obviously, this combined with (3.7) allows to conclude from Theorem 3.16
that (e1, e2) is a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x). We also refer to the fact that since (u
ε, vε)
is independent of Ft, the conditional probability P(·|Ft) of the event
{
Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 ) − ε ≤
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]
}
coincides with its probability. Indeed, also
{
Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 ) −
21
ε ≤ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2 [Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 )]
}
is independent of Ft. The proof is complete. 
Before we present the proof of the above Proposition, we give the following Lemmas, which
will be needed.
Lemma 3.22 For all ε > 0, and all δ ∈ [0, T − t] and x ∈ Rn, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T
independent of Ft, such that
W1(t, x)− ε ≤
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )], P− a.s.,
and
W2(t, x) − ε ≤
2G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [W2(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )], P− a.s.
Proof: Let Ft = (F ts)s∈[t,T ] denote the filtration generated by (Bs−Bt)s∈[t,T ] and augmented
by the P-null sets. By U ts,T (resp., V
t
s,T ) we denote the set of F
t-adapted processes {ur}r∈[s,T ]
(resp., {vr}r∈[s,T ]) taking their values in U (resp., V ). Moreover, let A
t
s,T (resp., B
t
s,T ) denote
the set of NAD strategies which map from Vts,T into U
t
s,T (resp. U
t
s,T into V
t
s,T ). With this
setting we replace the framework of SDEs driven by a Brownian motion B = (Bs)s∈[0,T ] by that
of SDEs driven by a Brownian motion (Bs −Bt)s∈[t,T ]. We also translate the above arguments
from the framework of SDEs to the associated BSDEs. Then, proceeding in the same manner
as above, but now in our new framework, we have the Isaacs condition, for j = 1, 2, s ∈ [t, T ],
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
{1
2
tr(σσT (s, x, u, v)A) + 〈p, b(s, x, u, v)〉 + fj(s, x, y, p
Tσ(s, x, u, v), u, v)
}
= inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
{1
2
tr(σσT (s, x, u, v)A) + 〈p, b(s, x, u, v)〉 + fj(s, x, y, p
Tσ(s, x, u, v), u, v)
}
for the associated value functionals
W˜1(s, x) = esssup
α∈At
s,T
essinf
β∈Bt
s,T
J1(s, x;α, β) = essinf
β∈Bt
s,T
esssup
α∈At
s,T
J1(s, x;α, β),
and
W˜2(s, x) = essinf
α∈At
s,T
esssup
β∈Bt
s,T
J2(s, x;α, β) = esssup
β∈Bt
s,T
essinf
α∈At
s,T
J2(s, x;α, β),
(s, x) ∈ [t, T ]× Rn.
For j = 1, 2, from [2] we know that Wj restricted to [t, T ]× R
n and W˜j are inside the class
of continuous functions with at most polynomial growth and the unique viscosity solutions of
the same Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation. Consequently, they coincide
W˜j(s, x) =Wj(s, x), (s, x) ∈ [t, T ]× R
n, j = 1, 2.
From the dynamic programming principle for W˜j and by observing that V
t
t,T ⊂ B
t
t,T we have
W1(t, x) = W˜1(t, x) = esssup
α∈At
t,T
essinf
β∈Bt
t,T
1G
t,x;α,β
t,t+δ [W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;α,β
t+δ )]
≤ esssup
α∈At
t,T
essinf
v∈Vt
t,T
1G
t,x;α(v),v
t,t+δ [W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;α(v),v
t+δ )].
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Consequently, for ε > 0 and δ > 0, there exists αε ∈ A
t
t,T such that, for all v ∈ V
t
t,T ,
W1(t, x)− ε ≤
1G
t,x;αε(v),v
t,t+δ [W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;αε(v),v
t+δ )], P− a.s.
The symmetric argument allows to show that the existence of βε ∈ B
t
t,T such that, for all u ∈ U
t
t,T ,
W2(t, x) − ε ≤
2G
t,x;u,βε(u)
t,t+δ [W2(t+ δ,X
t,x;u,βε(u)
t+δ )], P− a.s.
In the same way as shown in Lemma 3.5, we get the existence of (uε, vε) ∈ U tt,T ×V
t
t,T such that
αε(v
ε) = uε, βε(u
ε) = vε.
Therefore, we have
W1(t, x)− ε ≤
1G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [W1(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )],
and
W2(t, x)− ε ≤
2G
t,x;uε,vε
t,t+δ [W2(t+ δ,X
t,x;uε,vε
t+δ )].
The proof is complete. 
We also need the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.23 Let n ≥ 1 and let us fix some partition t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T of the interval
[t, T ]. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T independent of Ft, such that, for all
i = 0, · · · , n− 1,
W1(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε ≤ 1Gt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,ti+1
[W1(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)], P− a.s.,
and
W2(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε ≤ 2Gt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,ti+1
[W2(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)], P− a.s.
Proof: We shall give the proof by induction. By the above lemma, it is obvious for i = 0.
We now assume that (uε, vε) independent of Ft, is constructed on the interval [t, ti) and we
shall define it on [ti, ti+1). From the above lemma it follows that, for all y ∈ R
n, there exists
(uy, vy) ∈ Uti,T × Vti,T independent of Ft, such that,
Wj(ti, y)−
ε
2
≤ jGti,y;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
ti+1
)], P− a.s, j = 1, 2. (3.28)
Let us fix arbitrarily j = 1, 2. Moreover, for y, z ∈ Rn and s ∈ [ti, ti+1], we put
y1s =
jG
ti,y;uy,vy
s,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,y;uy,vy
ti+1
)], and y2s =
jG
ti,z;uy,vy
s,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,z;uy,vy
ti+1
)],
and we consider the BSDEs:
y1s = Wj(ti+1,X
ti,y;uy,vy
ti+1
) +
∫ ti+1
s
fj(r,X
ti ,y;uy,vy
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr
−
∫ ti+1
s
z1rdBr, s ∈ [ti, ti+1],
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and
y2s = Wj(ti+1,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1
) +
∫ ti+1
s
fj(r,X
ti ,z;uy,vy
r , y
2
r , z
2
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr
−
∫ ti+1
s
z2rdBr, s ∈ [ti, ti+1].
By virtue of the Lemmas 2.3, 3.1 and 3.9 we have
|jGti,y;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,y;uy,vy
ti+1
)]− jGti,z;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,z;uy,vy
ti+1
)]|2
≤ CE[|Wj(ti+1,X
t,y;uy ,vy
ti+1
)−Wj(ti+1,X
t,z;uy ,vy
ti+1
)|2
∣∣∣Ft]
+CE[|
∫ ti+1
ti
fj(r,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr −
∫ ti+1
ti
fj(r,X
ti ,z;u
y,vy
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
y
r , v
y
r )dr|
2
∣∣∣Ft]
≤ CE[|Xt,y;u
y,vy
ti+1
−Xt,z;u
y,vy
ti+1
|2
∣∣∣Ft] + CE[∫ ti+1
ti
|Xti,y;u
y,vy
r −X
ti,z;u
y,vy
r |
2dr
∣∣∣Ft]
≤ C|y − z|2.
Therefore, by the above inequality, Lemma 3.9 and (3.28)
Wj(ti, z)− ε ≤ Wj(ti, y)− ε+ C|y − z|
≤ jGti,y;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,y;u
y,vy
ti+1
)]−
ε
2
+ C|y − z|
≤ jGti,z;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,z;uy,vy
ti+1
)]−
ε
2
+ C|y − z|
≤ jGti,z;u
y,vy
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,z;u
y,vy
ti+1
)], P− a.s.,
for C|y − z| ≤
ε
2
.
Let {Oi}i≥1 ⊂ B(R
n) be a partition of Rn with diam(Oi) <
ε
2C
and let yl ∈ Ol. Then, for
z ∈ Ol,
Wj(ti, z)− ε ≤
jG
ti,z;u
yl ,vyl
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,z;u
yl ,vyl
ti+1
)], P− a.s., (3.29)
and we define
uε =
∑
l≥1
1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)uyl , vε =
∑
l≥1
1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)vyl .
Therefore, we have
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)]
= jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[
∑
l≥1
Wj(ti+1,X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti+1
)1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]
= jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[
∑
l≥1
Wj(ti+1,X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti+1
)1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]
=
∑
l≥1
jG
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
;uyl ,vyl
ti+1
)]1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
).
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The latter relation follows from the uniqueness of solutions of BSDEs. From (3.29) it follows
that
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)]
≥
∑
l≥1
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uyl ,vyl
ti
)− ε]1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)
=
∑
l≥1
Wj(ti,X
t,x;uyl ,vyl
ti
)1Ol(X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε
= Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε.
The proof is complete. 
Finally, we give the proof of Proposition 3.21.
Proof: Let t = t0 < t1 < · · · < tn = T be a partition of [t, T ], and τ = sup
i
(ti+1 − ti). From
Lemma 3.9 it follows that, for all j = 1, 2, 0 ≤ k ≤ n, s ∈ [tk, tk+1) and (u, v) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
E[|Wj(tk,X
t,x;u,v
tk
)−Wj(s,X
t,x;u,v
s )|
2]
≤ 2E[|Wj(tk,X
t,x;u,v
tk
)−Wj(s,X
t,x;u,v
tk
)|2]
+2E[|Wj(s,X
t,x;u,v
tk
)−Wj(s,X
t,x;u,v
s )|
2]
≤ C|s− tk|(1 + E[|X
t,x;u,v
tk
|2]) + CE[|Xt,x;u,vtk −X
t,x;u,v
s |
2]
≤ Cτ. (3.30)
Here and after C is a constant which may be different from line to line.
By virtue of Lemma 3.23 we let (uε, vε) ∈ Ut,T ×Vt,T be defined as in Lemma 3.23 for ε = ε0,
where ε0 > 0 will be specified later. Then, we have for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− ε0 ≤
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)], P− a.s.
For t ≤ s1 ≤ s2 ≤ T , we suppose, without loss of generality, that ti−1 ≤ s1 ≤ ti and tk ≤ s2 ≤
tk+1, for some 1 ≤ i < k ≤ n− 1. Therefore, by the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 we have
jG
t,x;uε,vε
ti,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]
= jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,tk
[jGt,x;u
ε,vε
tk ,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]]
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,tk
[Wj(tk,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk
)− ε0]
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,tk
[Wj(tk,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk
)]− Cε0
≥ · · · ≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,ti+1
[Wj(ti+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti+1
)]−C(k − i)ε0
≥ Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− C(k − i+ 1)ε0.
and the above inequality yields
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s1,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]
= jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti
[ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
ti,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]]
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)− C(k − i+ 1)ε0]
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≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]− C(k − i+ 1)ε0
≥ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]−
ε
2
,
where we put ε0 =
ε
2Cn
. Let us put
I1 =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s1,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]− jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)] +
ε
2
≥ 0,
I2 =
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2
[Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2
)]−Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
) +
ε
2
. (3.31)
We assert that
E[|I1 − I2|
2] ≤ Cτ.
Indeed, setting
ys =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s,ti
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)], s ∈ [s1, ti],
we have the associated BSDEs:
ys = Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
) +
∫ ti
s
fj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
−
∫ ti
s
zrdBr, s ∈ [s1, ti].
On the other hand, putting
y′s =Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1 ), s ∈ [s1, ti],
we have by Lemma 2.3
|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]−Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
)|2
≤ CE[|Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)−Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
)|2|Fs1 ]
+CE[
∫ ti
s1
|fj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , yr, zr, u
ε
r, v
ε
r)|
2|Fs1 ].
Therefore, from the boundedness of fj and the independence of Ft of (u
ε, vε) ∈ Ut,T × Vt,T ,
E[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]−Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
)|2|Ft]
≤ CE[|Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)−Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
)|2|Ft] +C(ti − s1)
= CE[|Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)−Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
)|2] + C(ti − s1).
From (3.30) it follows that
E[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,ti
[Wj(ti,X
t,x;uε,vε
ti
)]−Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
)|2] ≤ Cτ. (3.32)
By a similar argument we have
E[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s2,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]−Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2
)|2] ≤ Cτ. (3.33)
For s ∈ [s1, s2] we let
y1s =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)] = jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s,s2
[jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s2,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]],
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and
y2s =
jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s,s2
[Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2
)],
and we consider the associated BSDEs:
y1s =
jG
t,x;uε,vε
s2,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)] +
∫ s2
s
fj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , y
1
r , z
1
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
−
∫ s2
s
z1rdBr, s ∈ [s1, s2],
and
y2s = Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2 ) +
∫ s2
s
fj(r,X
t,x;uε,vε
r , y
2
r , z
2
r , u
ε
r, v
ε
r)dr
−
∫ s2
s
z2rdBr, s ∈ [s1, s2].
By virtue of the Lemmas 2.3 and 3.1 we have
|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]− jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2
[Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2
)]|2
≤ CE[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s2,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]−Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2
)|2
∣∣∣Fs1 ].
Consequently, from (3.33) it follows that
E[|jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,tk+1
[Wj(tk+1,X
t,x;uε,vε
tk+1
)]− jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2
[Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2
)]|2] ≤ Cτ.
By the above inequality and (3.32) we get
E[|I1 − I2|
2] ≤ Cτ.
Consequently,
P(I2 ≤ −
ε
2
) ≤ P(|I1 − I2| ≥
ε
2
) ≤
4E[|I1 − I2|
2]
ε2
≤
4Cτ
ε2
≤ ε,
where we choose τ ≤
ε3
4C
, and from (3.31) it follows that
P
(
Wj(s1,X
t,x;uε,vε
s1
)− ε ≤ jGt,x;u
ε,vε
s1,s2
[Wj(s2,X
t,x;uε,vε
s2
)]
)
≥ 1− ε.
The proof is complete. 
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